
\#1 In 2000, the Baby Boomers will be 36-54 years old.


* Figures in parentheses are the youngest and oldest ages of group members during 1996.


## - The Age Wave -



Currently, the labor force is the most mature since 1970 . Over the rest of the decade it will be as mature as during the late 1960s.



* Projected data start in 1994. Adult population is 15 years and older, and includes armed forces overseas.


## - The Age Wave -



## - The Age Wave -

\#6


* Percent of labor force 16-34 years old.
** Five-year moving average of yearly percent change in CPI.

* Percent of labor force 16-34 years old.
${ }^{* *}$ Five-year moving average of ten-year government bond yield.


Age Wave is probably a big influence on inflation trend and suggests inflation will remain subdued at least through end of the century. The Baby Boomers will be 36-54 years old by the year 2000.

## - Population: Numbers -



Source: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce

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## - Population: Numbers -



Source: Bureau of the Census, U.S. Department of Commerce
\#11


The working-age population grew much faster than the total population during the late 1960s and 1970s as the Baby Boomers flooded into the labor markets. In the 1990s, the growth of the working-age population is at record lows.

* Population used to calculate per capita income. Includes military in US. Source: Census Bureau.
** Source: US Department of Labor, Bureau of Economic Analysis.


The Baby Boomers are no longer young adults. As a result, household formation has declined sharply from 1.6 million per year, on average during the 1980s to 0.9 million per year from 1990 to 1994. This trend has depressed housing starts.

Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20.

## - Population: Characteristics -

\#13
Since the mid-1960s there has been a significant downtrend in the average number of people in both family and household living units. Households are smaller than families, on average, because there are many single-person households: People are marrying later, getting divorced, and living longer.


In 1993, nearly $30 \%$ of all households were not families, up from about 18\% in 1967. One-third of the nonfamily households are senior citizens.


[^0]
## - Population: Characteristics -



People are getting married for the first time at a later age. The medium age for men is up to nearly 27 from about 23 twenty years ago. Women are waiting until their mid-twenties to marry. During the 1950s and 1960s, they tended to marry in their early twenties.

The marriage rate has been moving gradually lower in recent years, while the divorce rate has been relatively steady.

## - Population: Characteristics -

he median age of the US population has risen sharply over the past 20 years because the Baby Boomers are aging and senior citizens are living longer. Life expectancy is up over 75 years compared to about 70 years during the late 1960s.

\#18


Source: Bureau of the Census, Geographical Mobility: March 1992 to March 1993, Current Population Reports, Series P-20.

## - Income \& Spending -

\#19

\#20


* Mean income of households divided by average population per household.

Per capita real personal income and consumption are at record highs. Productivity is the main determinant of these two measures of the standard of living and it is also at a record.

Both median and mean family household income data show virtually no growth over the past 25 years. Both measures need to be divided by the average size of the household unit, which has been falling. Adjusted this way, mean household income per capita has been growing in line with personal income per capita!

- Income \& Spending -


Real personal income growth has been on a downtrend over the past three decades as growth in productivity stagnated. This long-term trend should be reversed in the next decade.



## - Income \& Spending -



* Dashed lines show decades' annual averages.

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Consumer spending growth has been on a downtrend for quite some time because income growth has been on a downtrend. Income growth is likely to improve. The risk is that consumption growth won't do the same if the Baby Boomers decide to save more.


## - Income \& Spending -



On a per capita basis, the fastest growing categories of real consumption are medical care and recreation and entertainment. The other major categories are showing relatively little growth per capita.

\#27


* Rent includes owner- and tenant-occupied rent. Utilities include electricity, gas, water and other sanitary services, fuel oil and coal.


For the first time ever, consumers are spending as much of their budgets on medical care as on food. The proportion of total consumption spent on food has been declining for a long time, as consumers spend relatively more on medical care and recreation.


- Income \& Spending -


Source: Bureau of the Census, Income Statistics Branch, unpublished data.

During the 1980s, all household age groups shown here increased in numbers except the 55-64 group. During the 1990s, only the 35-44 and 45-54 year olds will grow.


Source: Bureau of the Census, Income Statistics Branch, unpublished data.

## - Income \& Spending -




* Mean income in 1993 dollars times number of households.

By the year 2000, 35-54 year olds will probably account for 65\% of personal income, up from about 50\% currently.

- Personal Savings -

As the Baby Boomers age over the rest of the decade, they will have more income than ever before. They will probably choose to save more of it. The savings rate should move over 7\% by the year 2000.
\#33


If the savings rate and incomes rise, so will total personal savings. By 2000, savings could climb to $\$ 300$ billion.
\#34


## - Personal Savings -



Personal savings includes two big "impersonal" sources of income which are not taxed and can only be saved. They exceed $\$ 250$ billion and currently exceed total personal savings. Indeed, excluding these two, "truly" personal savings has been mostly negative since 1987.

Males now account for less than $55 \%$ of the labor force, down from $70 \%$ in the early 1950s.

The labor force participation rate is hovering around $66 \%$. Since the 1950s, the decline in the male component of the labor force participation rate has been more than offset by females.



* Female labor force divided by female noninstitutional working-age population.


A record $53 \%$ of all woman who are 35 years or older are in the labor force. The labor force participation rate of younger women has stabilized around $70 \%$ in recent years.

The percent of older males participating in the labor force is flat around 70\%, while the younger ones' participation is around 83\%.

- Unemployment -
\#41


The unemployment rate shifted upward during the 1970s and early 1980s relative to inflation because there was a huge influx of young workers who tend to have higher unemployment rates than older ones. Since the early 1980s, the unemployment rate has been shifting back down.



There has been a dramatic long-term downward trend in the labor force participation rate of older men. The corporate restructurings of the past decade have not accelerated this trend.


During the 1950 s, 1960s, and 1970s, the female unemployment rate usually exceeded the male rate. Since the 1980s, the two rates have been nearly identical.

## - Health Care -



Spending on health care will continue to rise rapidly as Baby Boomers age.
\#46


## - Social Security -



Social Security will remain in surplus for the next 15 years. Big deficits will start when the Baby Boomers start to retire after 2010.

Dashed line is Congressional Bugdet Office's baseline projection.


Social security and health care outlays will rise sharply as the Baby Boomers age.

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[^0]:    Source: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Series P-20.

